Issue Details

Number

31744

Title

crypto: secure erase memory

Description

### Is there an existing issue for this? - [x] I have searched the existing issues ### Current behaviour In `AES256Encrypt::~AES256Encrypt()`: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/src/crypto/aes.cpp#L20 and `AES256Decrypt::~AES256Decrypt()`: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/src/crypto/aes.cpp#L35 `memset` is used to reset the `ctx` and `key`, this is not secure and can be optimized out by the compiler: https://www.cryptologie.net/article/419/zeroing-memory-compiler-optimizations-and-memset_s/ Instead use secure erase primitives such as `OPENSSL_cleanse`: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/crypto/mem_clr.c ### Expected behaviour `memset` should be avoided to reset the `ctx` and `key`, ### Steps to reproduce NA ### Relevant log output _No response_ ### How did you obtain Bitcoin Core Compiled from source ### What version of Bitcoin Core are you using? master ### Operating system and version Linux ### Machine specifications _No response_

URL

https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issue/31744

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